FORK-256 is a hash function presented at FSE 2006. Whereas SHA-like designs process messages in one stream, FORK-256 uses four parallel streams for hashing. In this article, we present the first cryptanalytic results on this design strategy. First, we study a linearized variant of FORK-256, and show several unusual properties of this linearized variant. We also explain why the linearized model can not be used to mount attacks similar to the recent attacks by Wang et al. on SHA-like hash functions. Second, we show how collision attacks, exploiting the non-bijectiveness of the nonlinear functions of FORK-256, can be mounted on reduced variants of FORK-256. We show an efficient attack on FORK-256 reduced to 2 streams and present actual colliding pairs. We expect that our attack can also be extended to FORK-256 reduced to 3 streams. For the moment our approach does not appear to be applicable to the full FORK-256 hash function.
Introduction
Recent results in cryptanalysis of hash functions [6, 5] show weaknesses in many commonly used hash functions, such as SHA-1 and MD5. Therefore, the cryptanalysis of alternative hash functions is of great interest. In this article, we will study the hash function FORK-256. It was proposed by Hong et al. at FSE 2006 [2] . FORK-256 was designed to be resistant against known-attack strategies including the attack by Wang et al. used to break SHA-1 [5] .
In this article, we present the first cryptanalytic results on FORK-256 and stream-reduced variants. On the one hand we explain why the linearized model can not be used to mount attacks similar to the attack of Wang et al. on SHA-1. All the characteristics we found in the linearized variant of the hash function have a low probability to hold in the original FORK-256 hash function. On the other hand, we show several unusual properties in the linearized variant of the hash function, which are not common in the linearized variants of other hash functions, as for instance the SHA-family [3] .
Furthermore, we show how collision attacks, exploiting the non-bijectiveness of the nonlinear functions of FORK-256, can be mounted on reduced variants of FORK-256. We show an efficient attack on FORK-256 reduced to 2 streams and present a colliding message pair. We expect that the attack can be extended to FORK-256 reduced to 3 streams.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. A description of the hash function is given in Section 2. In Section 3, we show that the linearized variant of the FORK-256 has several unusual properties. Differential attacks on FORK-256 using the linearized variant for finding a suitable characteristic are studied in Section 4. In Section 5, we give a truncated differential which can be used to break stream-reduced variants of FORK-256. A sample colliding message pair for FORK-256 reduced to two streams is given in this section as well. Conclusions are presented in Section 6.
Description of the Hash Function FORK-256
The FORK-256 hash function was proposed by Hong et al. in [2] . It is an iterative hash function that processes 512-bit input message blocks and produces a 256-bit hash value. Unlike other commonly used hash functions, such as the SHA-family, it consists of 4 parallel streams which we denote B 1 , B 2 , B 3 and B 4 . In each stream the state variables are updated according to the expanded message words and combined with the chaining variables after the last step, depicted in Fig. 1 . In the following, we briefly describe the FORK-256 hash function. It basically consists of two parts: the message expansion and the state update transformation. A detailed description of the hash function is given in [2] . 
Message Expansion
The message expansion of FORK-256 is a permutation of the 16 message words m i in each stream, where different permutations are used. The ordering of the message words for each stream is given by the permutations Σ 1 , Σ 2 , Σ 3 and Σ 4 , where Σ j (M ) = w j = (m σj (0) , . . . , m σj (15) ). Table 1 . Ordering of the message words step k 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 σ1(i) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 σ2(i) 14 15 11 9 8 10 3 4 2 13 0 5 6 7 12 1 σ3(i) 7 6 10 14 13 2 9 12 11 4 15 8 5 0 1 3 σ4(i) 5 12 1 8 15 0 13 11 3 10 9 2 7 14 4 6
State Update Transformation
The state update transformation starts from a (fixed) initial value IV of eight 32-bit registers and updates them in 4 parallel streams of 8 steps. In each step 2 message words are used to update the eight state variables. Fig. 2 The non-linear functions f and g used in each step are defined as follows.
Two step constants K j,2i and K j,2i+1 are added in step i; the constants are different for each step of the stream. The order of the constants is different in each stream. The ordering of the constants for each stream is given in Table 2 .
For the actual values of the constants δ 0 to δ 15 we refer to [2] . After the last step of the state update transformation, the chaining variables and the output values of the last step of the four streams are combined, resulting in the final value of one iteration (feed forward). The feed forward is a word-wise modular addition of the IV and the output of the state update transformation. The result is the final hash value or the initial value for the next message block.
L-FORK-256: A Linearized Variant of FORK-256
In this section, we analyze the linearized variant of FORK-256. We show that the linearized variant L-FORK-256 has several properties that are not common in the linearized variants of other hash functions. However, so far we do not see how these properties can be used in an attack on the original FORK-256 hash function. L-FORK-256 is constructed by replacing all modular additions in the hash function by XOR operations.
The 4 streams B j can be described as follows.
with S j some permutation matrices, and A, B matrices that describe the action of L-FORK-256 on the chaining value input, respectively the message input. The matrices A are of little importance, since:
Action on Special Message Words
The four streams of FORK-256 are quite similar. Only the ordering of the constants and the message words is different in each stream.
Observation 1. If we have a message M with repeating message words
M = m 0 , m 1 , . . . , m 15 with m i = m j ∀i, j, then Σ 1 (M ) = Σ 2 (M ) = Σ 3 (M ) = Σ 4 (M ).
Observation 2.
In L-FORK-256, for inputs that are repeating messages, we have that
Consequently, the description (2) of a stream can be reduced to:
and the description(6) of L-FORK-256 becomes
which is independent of M n . Observe that having a repeating message as input is a sufficient condition for this effect, but it is not a necessary condition. It can be verified that (8) holds whenever the input message satisfies the following 12 conditions:
Fixed-Points
In L-FORK-256 we can easily construct a fix-point for any value of the chaining variables CV n .
Theorem 1. A two-block message can be used to construct a two-step fixed point in L-FORK-256.
Proof: By combining two repeated messages, we can construct a fixed point for
Theorem 2. Two fixed-points and an arbitrary message block M 3 can be used to produce a collision in L-FORK-256.
Proof: Let M 1 , M 2 be repeating messages and let M 3 be an arbitrary message. Define y = L-FORK-256(IV, M 3 ). Then the hash values of M = M 3 |M 2 |M 1 and M * = M 2 |M 1 |M 3 are given by:
Output Dependencies
In L-FORK-256 we found several output dependencies. However, statistical tests show that these are not present in the original hash function.
Observation 3. Three linear dependencies exist between the 256 output bits of L-FORK-256. These 3 dependencies are the following:
From (10) it follows that the parity of the output of L-FORK-256 is constant.
Differential Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of FORK-256 against differential attacks.
We study the impact of the type of attack that was used by Wang et al. to break SHA-1 [5] . The attack can be summarized as follows. First, find a collision producing characteristic with high probability in the linearized variant of the hash function. Second, use random trials to find a message pair that follows the linear characteristic. 
Finding a Characteristic
The matrices S and B are described in Section 3. A collision-producing difference can be found by solving the set of linear equations given in (11). Furthermore, the following theorem shows that every near-collision [1] can be turned into a collision with only a minor increase in complexity. Proof:
Minimizing the Number of Conditions
It is difficult to bound the number of conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to guarantee that the message follows the characteristic in the original FORK-256 hash function. A commonly used approach is to use the Hamming weight of the expanded message to approximate the attack complexity. This approximation is useful for SHA-1, but does not hold in the case of FORK-256. A property of L-FORK-256 is that collision producing differences with very low weight in the message, can easily result in very high weights in the internal states of the four separate streams. Hence, to get a more accurate approximation of the final attack complexity the weight of the internal state variables has to be considered as well. We used algorithms from coding theory to find characteristics with low Hamming weight. Even if the algorithms are probabilistic they are expected to do a good job as they did in the case of SHA-1 [4] . In Table 3 , the smallest found weights for FORK-256 and reduced variants are shown.
Converting the Hamming weights to numbers of conditions is complicated by the following issues. 3. Conditions imposed on bits in the MSB position of a 32-bit word may be fulfilled automatically, due to carry overflow effects. 4. Some conditions might be reworked to linear conditions involving only message bits. Such conditions are easy to fulfill and don't contribute to the probability of the characteristic.
A rough estimation of the work factor can be made by taking the Hamming weight of the internal state variables and the weight of the expanded message.
For FORK-256 with all four streams, the estimate probability for a random message having the chosen differences to follow the linear characteristic and to collide is 2 −1280 . The probability for a near-collision is 2 −704 . These probabilities are too small to pose a realistic threat to the hash function. Note that the smallest found Hamming weight for one stream is equal to the local collision given in [2] .
A Differential Characteristic for 4 Steps with Probability 1
For four (out of eight) steps of FORK-256 there exists a characteristic with probability 1. If we choose the same difference δ in all message words m * i = m i ⊕ δ, for i = 0, . . . , 15 and differences in all chaining variables A j,k = · · · = H j,k = δ for j = 1, . . . , 4 for a k < 5 then we have after 4 steps:
This characteristic holds with probability 1 for δ = 80000000. For all the other cases the probability of the characteristic is approximately 2 −HW(δ) * 12 * 4 . It is difficult to use this characteristic to break FORK-256. To construct a collision we would need a characteristic (not necessary linear) for the first 4 steps in each stream that produces the needed differences in all the chaining variables.
Truncated Differential Attack
The function f and g map a 32-bit input word to a 32-bit output. By design, these functions are not invertible (although their linear approximations are). This means we could try to construct collisions by using values x = x * which have the property that f (x) = f (x * ) and g(x+δ k ) = g(x * +δ k ). For the analysis, it is most convenient to consider as difference operation the modular difference:
(12)
One Stream
We first consider one stream of the hash function. For the attack, we want to exploit a truncated characteristic of the following form:
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
⊕changes the difference (0, 0, α, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (13c) ⇓ ⊕changes the difference (0, 0, 0, β, 0, 0, 0, 0) (13d) ⇓ ⊕changes the difference (0, 0, 0, 0, γ, 0, 0, 0)
The difference in the 5th register can be canceled by adding a message block with a suitable difference. Alternatively, the characteristic can be concatenated with a rotated version of itself. The probability of the first step depends on the difference x and on the value of the constant δ k . There are many δ k values for which the probability of the differential equals 0, but there is also a significant fraction for which one can find at least one x such that the probability becomes greater than zero. We call a δ k value weak, if there exists at least one difference x for which the probability of the differential is greater than 0.
Weak Constants
By doing an exhaustive search we found 2 weak constants for the right side and 4 weak constants for the left side of one stream of FORK-256. The weak constants are shown in Table 4 . These weak constants can be used to break one stream of FORK-256. To break FORK-256 with more than one stream we would need more weak constants (see Section 5.4) . Therefore, we have to extend the concept of weak constants as described in the next section.
Semi-weak Constants: Extending the Idea of Weak Constants
Instead of searching for pairs x, x * having zero differences at the output of f and g, we can extend the search to pairs x, x * such that:
and Δf = Δg
where the last condition is equivalent to Δf = Δg 4. We found many pairs x, x * and constants δ k which fulfill (14). A subset of these are given in Table 7 and Table 8 in the appendix. We restrict the search to values Δf and Δg with low Hamming weight to keep the final attack complexity low. Note that additional conditions have to be fulfilled to guarantee that the differences at the output of f and g cancel out within one step. In detail, the probability that the differences cancel out is approximately 2 −3·HW(Δf ) . Note, that for Δf = 0 the minimal Hamming weight is 8.
The Full Hash Function
If we consider the full hash, then we have to take into account two effects:
1. Due to the different permutations Σ j , the message blocks enter in the different streams at different steps. This property complicates the attack. 2. Due to the final addition of the streams, we can convert near-collisions for each of the streams into collisions for the full hash. This property facilitates the attack.
If we consider a variant of FORK-256 where the output of the functions f and g are not considered, then there are no interactions between the different registers in the streams. For this variant, we can easily construct a collision. Note that for each x j,i which has a non-zero difference we need one weak constant to guarantee that the original FORK-256 hash function behaves like the variant.
To minimize the number of (needed) weak constant, we have to minimize the number of differences in x j = (x j,0 , . . . , x j,15 ), for j = 1, 2, 3, 4. In Table 5 , we list the best results we found for FORK-256 and stream-reduced variants. Since we would need 12 weak constants to break the original FORK-256 hash function, this attack strategy is not applicable to FORK-256. We expect a complexity of at least 2 12·3·HW(Δf ) ≥ 2 288 applications of the compression function to find a collision in FORK-256. However, FORK-256 reduced to 2 streams can be broken easily with this method as shown in Section 5.5.
A Collision for Two Streams of FORK-256
In this section, we present a collision for FORK-256 reduced to two streams using the attack strategy described before. In the following, we will describe how to -
construct a collision in FORK-256 reduced to stream 1 and stream 2. Note that the attack would work similar to break FORK-256 reduced to 2 other streams.
Considering the ordering of the message words in stream 1 and stream 2 (see Table 1 ), we see that the distance (in number of steps) between m 0 and m 9 is 4 in both streams. Hence, we need only two weak constants in the attack. The attack can be summarized as follows.
1. Choose x 1,0 = 7AB8131D and x * 1,0 = 728D1B48 and calculate B 1,1 and B * 1,1 . 2. Choose x 2,3 = E2E5A2A9 and x * 2,3 = A6378BEC and calculate F 2,2 and F * 2,2 . 3. Choose suitable values for x 1,2 , x 1,4 and x 1, 6 such that E 1,4 = −x 2,3 . 4. Choose suitable values for x 2,5 , x 2,7 and x 2,9 such that A 2,5 = −x 1,0 . 5. We have 24 conditions on B 1,0 , C 1,0 , D 1,0 that have to be fulfilled to guarantee that the differences at the output of f and g cancel out in step 0 of stream 1. Therefore, we use an arbitrary first message block to get suitable values for B 1,0 , C 1,0 , D 1,0 that satisfy all necessary conditions. To find this first message block takes at most 2 24 hash computations. 
M0
0F427DBAA 06FBF0CB7 0413F646C 0FCE4800E 0AF327AFD 05CB1B99A 00C879908 0FD5EA595 0BA603C95 06CF74DC6 0516E4AD5 01E43C9B5 03A112367 0258259E8 0FC3FA69D 0CD4F8D0C h1 06A09E667 0C1F86BBC 0D2856B94 052847CA9 0B8D977FE 0EE42EED7 0A309479B 05C5A4DA8
M1
010AE2CB6 000000000 010ABB697 000000000 0197E717C 000000000 01FDE8BA2 000000000 0D4A419E3 0E3082DF1 0E7C9B7DB 000000000 000000000 0B93DF199 000000000 0314E6339 M * 1 0088334E1 000000000 010ABB697 000000000 0197E717C 000000000 01FDE8BA2 000000000 0D4A419E3 0A65A1734 0E7C9B7DB 000000000 000000000 0B93DF199 000000000 0314E6339 M 1 0082AF7D5 000000000 000000000 000000000 000000000 000000000 000000000 000000000 000000000 03CAE16BD 000000000 000000000 000000000 000000000 000000000 000000000 h2 06A09E667 06D320398 00E1A7F40 0A359E80E 0E029DE72 019F5C484 032084418 0836E2FD8 h * 2 06A09E667 06D320398 00E1A7F40 0A359E80E 0E029DE72 019F5C484 032084418 0836E2FD8 6. We also have 24 conditions on F 2,1 , G 2,1 , H 2,1 in stream 2 that have to be fulfilled to guarantee that the differences at the output of f and g cancel out in step 1 of stream 2. Therefore, we have to modify x 2,1 to satisfy these conditions. We can find a suitable value for x 2,1 in at most 2 24 trials. 7. Calculate m i for i = 0, . . . , 15 from the x-values calculated in step 1-6.
Note that there are 2 conditions on m 4 . To satisfy both conditions we calculate first m 4 = w 1,4 = x 1,4 − A 1,2 and then we use m 8 to modify E 2,3 such that m 4 = w 1,7 = x 2,7 − E 2,3 holds.
With this method we can easily construct collisions in the FORK-256 variant. Once we have fixed the values of the chaining variables by using an arbitrary first message block and have determined x 1,0 , x 1,2 , x 1,4 , x 1,6 , x 2,1 , x 2,3 , x 2,5 , x 2,7 , and x 2,9 we can construct many collisions by solving the system of equations given in step (7) of the attack. We can construct about 2 (16−9)·32 colliding message pairs once we have fixed all the x-values. This can be compared to having 224 neutral bits [1] in the message. In Table 6 , we give a colliding message for FORK-256 reduced to the first 2 streams. Complexity Analysis. In this section, we will give a detailed complexity analysis of the attack on FORK-256 reduced to 2 streams. The attack basically consists of 2 parts:
1. Find the values of Table 7 and Table 8 in the appendix 2. Find suitable x-values.
The first part of the attack has complexity of at most 2 32 · 4 = 2 34 computations of f and g. This is equivalent to at most 2 28 computation of the compression function of FORK-256. Note that the real complexity might be much lower, since g is only calculated if Δf is correct. While the first part of the attack is computational expensive, the second part of the attack has a comparable low complexity. For each difference in x j,i for j = 1, 2, 3, 4 and i = 0, . . . , 15 we have to fulfill 24 conditions on the chaining variables and further find 3 suitable x-values to guarantee the that the difference cancel out after 4 steps. Therefore, we need 9 x-values in the attack on the first 2 streams. To find all these x-values and calculating the first block to fulfill all conditions on the chaining variables take us at most 7 · 2 32 calculations of f and g, and 2 24 hash computations. Note that the probability for finding a suitable x-value is much higher than 2 −32 in practice. Thus, the complexity will be much lower than 2 29 for this part of the attack. Hence, the final attack complexity for both parts of the attack is about 2 29 for the first collision. Many other collisions can be constructed with probability 1 afterward. Improving/Extending the Attack. There are several ways to improve the attack. In the following we list some of them:
1. The attack can be modified to construct collisions in FORK-256 reduced to two other streams. 2. As shown by way of an example, the degrees of freedom (the number of neutral bits) we have in the attack on 2 streams is quite large. Thus, we can try to extend the attack to 3 streams of FORK-256. 3. Since the number of needed weak constants is too large for an attack on the original FORK-256 hash function, we could try to construct a near-collision in the hash function (only 6 weak constants needed). 4. Instead of searching for values (x, x * ) for which Δf = Δg, we can extend the search to values for which Δf = Δg, but the differences cancel out due to carries of the modular addition. Therefore, we have to find a good method to reduce the search space and the runtime for finding these values, respectively.
Conclusions
In this article we presented the first cryptanalytic results on the hash function FORK-256. We showed that the linearized variant of FORK-256 has several unusual properties which do not exist in the linearized variants of other hash functions. We also explained why the linearized model can not be used to mount attacks similar to the recent attacks by Wang et al. on SHA-like hash functions. Furthermore, we showed how collision attacks, exploiting the non-bijectiveness of the nonlinear functions of FORK-256, can be mounted on reduced variants of FORK-256. We presented an efficient attack on FORK-256 reduced to 2 streams. Moreover, we expect that our attack can also be extended to FORK-256 reduced to 3 streams. For the moment our approach does not appear to be applicable to the full FORK-256 hash function.
However, this does not prove that FORK-256 is secure. Further analysis is required to get a good view on the security margins of FORK-256.
